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Abstract 
 The southern state of Quintana Roo, Mexico has been, for almost a 
century, stage of a colonization strategy based on community forestry. To 
consolidate this initiative, forest product marketing is of central importance. 
To understand related problems, it has proven useful to see them as 
embedded in value chains.  The present study aims at understanding the main 
determinants in the changes in value chains that imply improvement or 
deterioration in the position of forest communities. To this purpose, a 
historical approach has been chosen. Based on archival studies and 
bibliographical research, four aspects of value chain development – land 
uses, governmental action, value chain actors, and external demand – have 
been analysed for the first half of the 20th century. Two major value chains 
were identified for this period. The first concerned the production of 
chewing-gum base, elaborated from the sap of Manilkara sapota, a tree 
species very common in the region. The second concerned mahogany logs. 
While communities were able to insert themselves in the first value chain, 
mahogany log production remained in the hands of private companies 
throughout the time analysed. The insertion of communities was made 
possible due to a bold governmental effort and the relative negotiating 
weakness of international buyers, which were exposed to strong competition 
in a quickly concentrating market. The insertion in the chewing-gum value 
chain brought significant income increases for forest communities and its 
members. It also implied a clearer “interface”, in which negotiations became 
more market driven, and less dependent on factors like state financing or 
political will.  
 
Keywords: Forestry, forest product marketing, value chains, Mexico 
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Introduction 
 Quintana Roo is a densely forested state in the south eastern Yucatan 
peninsula in Mexico. For almost a century, its southern region has been the 
stage for a unique colonization initiative. Scarcely populated since the 
demise of maya civilization in the 16th century, this region became a target of 
massive colonization in the early 20th century. But unlike most colonization 
schemes, which build on small scale agricultural land-use, this region was 
colonized through the establishment of forest-using communities. These 
communities, so called ejidos proved resilient enough to subsist until today, 
many still having forest use as their main source of income.  
 To establish and consolidate community forestry, a central 
precondition is its financial viability. The forest communities in Quintana 
Roo depend on revenues from forest product extraction to make a living and 
to be able to implement the investments in forest production and 
conservation. Therefore, the form in which these communities insert in 
markets is very important. Normally, the communities are not connected 
directly with the end users of their products, but indirectly through several 
links of trade and processing which as a whole are called value chains. 
Incomes for forest communities depend on the specific position they have in 
these chains, especially the power they have to negotiate with their 
customers. 
 The factors that determine the position of an actor in a value chain 
are not fixed. Not only can an actor improve or worsen its position in time, 
but also the moves of other actors in the same chain may have an impact on 
its position. Furthermore, external actors like the state may alter the relations 
among chain members, for example shifting negotiating power from one link 
to another.  
 In order to promote community forestry, it is important to understand 
the factors that influence the market insertion of communities. Only then, 
financial and marketing promotion instruments may unfold their full 
potential, targeting not only the communities themselves, but also other 
actors. In particular, the possibilities of state actors, with their strong 
normative power need to be fully understood in order to determine feasible 
ways of action in community forestry promotion. 
 The determinants for market insertion of forest communities and for 
the rest of value chains are not easily studied, as they are of very different 
nature. For example, forest assets can be measured in a very different way 
than the policies that act on market insertion. In this situation, a historical 
approach offers several advantages. Through a mostly inductive procedure, 
the most apparent factors in a certain situation may be easily considered. 
Furthermore, as value chains change in time, specific factors are more easily 
determined as having an influence. 
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 The present study analyses changes in the market insertion of 
communities in Quintana Roo during the first half of the 20th century. It aims 
to demonstrate the state´s capacity of influencing the way communities are 
inserted in markets.  
  
Methods and conceptual approach 
 The present study, as most historic accounts, takes an inductive 
stance to the understanding of processes (Möllering 2006). The materials 
used, covering the first half of the 20th century, come mainly from two 
archives: first, the Archivo General de la Nación in Mexico-City, and 
second, the Archivo Estatal de Quintana Roo in Chetumal. The archival 
information was complemented by published bibliography. 
 The basic procedure has been to describe the range and dynamics of 
individual elements and then connect these elements for a broader appraisal 
of market insertion. The elements considered were:  
• Land use and land cover change: as a base for all other points, land 
use and the accompanying land cover changes as a consequence of 
colonization are described in general terms.  
• Ideologies, institutions and organizations: after a brief effort of 
characterizing ideological strings that were relevant for shaping each phase, 
its main institutions and organizations have been described, as defined by 
Scott (2001). The description of institutions encompasses rules (laws, 
regulations, programs) and norms.  
• External demand: a description of national and international demand 
that exerted influence on the region. 
• Production chains: a description of the most important regional 
production chains in each historical phase. 
• Market insertion: an appraisal of outstanding cases of insertion in 
each historical phase. 
 As a result, four accounts of path development, seen from different 
perspectives, appear. These four accounts will later be discussed in order to 
reach conclusions. 
 
Results: a chronology of market insertion paths 
 The first half of the 20th century encompasses the beginning of land 
colonization in southern Quintana Roo, promoted by wood and chewing-gum 
base extraction and shaped by the efforts of the central Mexican government 
to enforce the frontier with British Honduras.  At the national level, it started 
with the Porfirian rule, a “modernist”, dictatorial government that promoted 
private enterprise. It ended with “socialist revolutionary” governments that 
distributed large forest surfaces to newly established communities during the 
most important land reform initiative in Mexico: the ejido. With this land 
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granting, forest communities became actors in the marketing of forest 
products. 
 
The beginnings of forest use in Quintana Roo in the late 19th and early 
20th century 
 In order to understand the changes in 20th century value chains, it is 
necessary to briefly survey describe  the beginnings of forest use in the 19th 
century. The history of modern Quintana Roo might be conceived to start in 
1847, when a fraction of maya peasants and hacienda workers living in edges 
of the then independent Yucatan Republic rose up against the Yucatán order 
in a social and religious war that would last more than half a century. In the 
course of this war, the Maya would retract beyond the agricultural frontier 
into the forests of eastern Yucatan into what today is central Quintana Roo. 
There, they would find a speaking cross, establish their capital and start 
repeated raids against Yucatecan cities and settlements (Reed 1987). To 
finance their war, the rebel mayas would gain the control of what today is 
southern Quintana Roo, back then an almost uninhabited region with forests 
rich in logwood (Haematoxilum campechianum) and Mahogany, 
concessioning these forests to British loggers operating from Belize City, in 
exchange of money, provisions, or arms (Villalobos-Gonzalez  2006:53). 
 At the beginning of the 20th century, the rebel Mayas had not been 
decimated by the enemy, but by hunger and diseases, and the Mexican 
government, which in the meantime had integrated Yucatán as another 
Mexican state, started several initiatives to regain control of what it 
considered part of Mexico. The main elements were increased military 
actions in central Quintana Roo, an international border treaty with Britain, 
as the neighbouring British Honduras was still British, that involved ceding 
the lands south of the Hondo river as a token to end British cooperation with 
the Maya rebels, and the establishment of Payo Obispo, now Chetumal, as 
the new territorial capital near the mouth of the Hondo river, then the most 
important exit for the most important regional commodity: wood (Careaga 
1990).  
 To increase its state control, an explicit colonization policy was 
started. When Payo Obispo was established, southern Quintana Roo was a 
virtually unoccupied space. The Mayan revolt and the punishing raids by the 
Mexican government had forced the few inhabitants of southern Quintana 
Roo to leave their villages and settle in British Honduras or in the vicinity of 
larger cities in northern Yucatán (Reed 1987). What remained were scattered 
“pacific” Maya populations, small villages of tolerated Mexican farmers and 
a floating population of wood extraction workers along the Rio Hondo 
employed by Belizean companies (Cesar and Arnaiz 1983:112). From the 
perspective of the central government’s perspective, this frontier was in need 
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of a population that pledged allegiance to the Mexican nation. Leaving the 
Maya population in central Quintana Roo to its own resources, governmental 
efforts went into the external colonization of the southern part of Quintana 
Roo (Careaga 1990; Higuera 1997; Macias Richard 1997). 
 While the colonization policies and the colonization process itself 
were subject to many detours in the following decades, as a in the result, 
southern Quintana Roo, as an example of a recently colonized frontier, is 
unique in several aspects. First, it is one of the oldest examples in which an 
almost uninhabited space was colonized under official forest utilization 
schemes, as opposed to agricultural conversion. Second, it is an example of a 
colonization in which land was granted to (newly established) communities 
and not to individuals. Third, the communities created to manage land were 
not culturally homogenous, but were a motley group in terms of provenance, 
experiences, and expectations. These aspects set the region apart from other 
Mexican regions with community forestry, which generally built on long 
standing communities with established governance and land-use institutions, 
for example in Oaxaca. Furthermore, most other examples of successful 
establishment of community forestry in Mexico are located in regions of 
coniferous forests (Alatorre Frenk 1998; Bray and Merino-Pérez 2004). 
 
Land use 
 To pursue the consolidation of the frontier with British Honduras in 
the early 20th century, the Mexican state fostered the extraction of logwood, 
mahogany and chewing-gum base to promote colonization of the land. While 
logwood would soon disappear as a commercial product, mahogany and 
chewing-gum base became the dominant land uses and important motors for 
economic growth in the state for the first half of the century. For more than 
three decades, these activities were organized through concessions to private 
entrepreneurs on state land. Only after 1935, this scheme would be 
challenged by the establishment of community land ownership.  
 The concessions granted to private entrepreneurs varied markedly in 
their characteristics. Under the Porfirian rule, the concessionaires were 
foreign firms that held large surfaces of forests for 10 to 25 years, often 
attached to the condition of colonizing and developing the estate, for 
example through the construction of permanent roads. After the successful 
Mexican revolution in 1910, extraction rights went to Mexicans, who often 
acted as front men for foreign firms. Concession areas and granting periods 
diminished, as did the conditions imposed on concessionaires regarding their 
efforts of colonization and development. 
 During the Porfirian rule, most concessionaires in southern Quintana 
Roo were American or British firms active either in the mahogany or in the 
logwood business (chewing gum firms would come later). For example, the 
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Stamford Manufacturing Company was a leading producer of dyes in the US. 
The Banco de Londres y Mexico was a British Mexican joint venture 
extracting mainly mahogany, and the Mengel Brothers Company, an 
American firm, extracted both mahogany and dyewood (Villalobos-Gonzalez 
2003:60). Aiming at increasing the extraction radius of operations away from 
the rivers, these firms invested heavily in infrastructure, for example in 
railroad lines. As a consequence, they were able to reach spots as far away as 
60 km from water bodies. These firms employed a large number of workers. 
For example, the Mengel Company, holding a concession of 70,300 ha, 
employed 1500 workers in a time when Payo Obispo had a population of 
1000 people (Sánchez and Toscano 1990 [1919]:95). As these companies 
shipped logs for export into high-end markets, the cutting diameter was high. 
Therefore, many trees with smaller diameters remained in the forest (Galletti 
1993:137). 
 Normally, firms had to pay fees per concessioned area and per 
extracted volume. The granting of concessions was derived mainly from 
political connections. The efficiency, capital endowment, experience or other 
performance characteristics of a company were of little importance to obtain 
a concession. During this time lapse, the government showed no interest in 
whatever silvicultural considerations. Its task was mainly the collection of 
duties. Although the early logging concessionaires strongly mechanized 
extraction operations, there exist no evidences of silvicultural considerations 
in the extraction companies either. Forest workers, be it chicle rubber 
tappers,  or wood extraction workers, were the lowest stage in the production 
scheme (Galletti 1993; Macías-Zapata 2004) 
 The chewing-gum base (chicle), the logwood and the mahogany log 
extraction operations, dealing with different products, led to different land 
use patterns and to different commercial systems. Chewing-gum base is 
obtained from the latex of the chicozapote tree (Manilkara zapota): the 
chiclero climbs the trunk of the tree with a rope, cutting rhombic incisions in 
the bark with a machete. The obtained sap is then cooked into raw, solid 
chewing-gum base cubes. Chicle is easy to transport and has a high value/ 
weight ratio. Therefore, it could be transported over long distances – in its 
boom time, it was transported with small aircrafts. As a consequence, its 
exploitation followed no specific geographical pattern, but was determined 
by the existence of areas with a high concentration of chicozapote trees. 
Therefore, chicle concessions were issued as elongated rectangles, which 
were narrow at the waterfront, especially along the Hondo River, and from 
there went deep into the forest. By contrast, mahogany logs were attached to 
the vicinity of water flows or to strong investments in log transport 
infrastructure. As a consequence, log concessions tended to cover large areas 
along major waterways (Galletti 1993:, p.144; Rosado Vega 1998 
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[1940]:144). Finally, logwood, whose commercial life as an important 
dyeing material was fading out in the beginning 20th century, grew on 
temporarily flooded g areas in which mahogany did not grow, often along 
the coast, was quite easy to transport, as the log diameters usually are 
reduced, and the required log lengths were also small (Camille 1996:81) 
 Colonization did not immediately follow these uses. In the beginning, 
there was a large “floating population” trailing the boom and bust that is 
typical of many pre-frontier regions (Cesar and Arnaiz 1983:15). People 
came for the chicle season (during the rainy season) or for the logging season 
(in the dry months), and then returned to Payo Obispo66 or to other Mexican 
states. This population slowly settled down in Chetumal and in villages that 
appeared alongside waterways and served as trade and shipping points. 
Nevertheless, despite a relatively large forest production, the steady 
population only rose slightly in the first decades, increasing  from 3300 in 
1910 to 4600 twenty years later (a yearly population growth of less than 2%) 
(Cesar and Arnaiz 1983:125). The same can be said of the amount of land 
granted to individuals, groups or state entities. Until 1924, less than 
20,000 ha had been declared as private, village or federal land. An 
overwhelming area  remained as “national” land (Galletti 1993:147148, 
p.147,148).  
 This situation changed dramatically in the thirties, when Lázaro 
Cárdenas became president. Cárdenas was a career soldier of the 
revolutionary army that had become a progressive politician. Together with 
his appointed governor in Quintana Roo, Rafael Melgar, they set out to 
change the structure of land use and commodity production: more than 
200,000 ha were granted as ejidos in southern Quintana Roo. The unique 
feature of these ejidos was that they were oriented towards forest use (as 
opposed to agriculture), the main programmed use being chicle extraction. 
For this purpose, a very large per capita area  (more than 400 ha), was 
established for these ejidos, as this was the extension estimated necessary to 
provide enough income from chicle tapping for an ejidatario family. As a 
consequence, the loose forest settlements became officially recognized not 
only as villages, but also as organized forest and land owners with clearly 
demarcated areas, with owners living on the land and using its forests 
(Argüelles 1991; Rosado Vega 1998 [1940]:248). 
 While these new circumstances had no immediate impact on forest 
cover or the way forests were used, the newly created actors decisively 
directed land-use dynamics in the following decades, as a feature of ejidos 
was their implicit capacity of taking communal land-use decisions. Through 
the ejido assembly, logging and chewing-gum permits and other land-use 
                                                            
66 At that time, Chetumal, the capital of the territory, was still called Payo Obispo.  
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issues would at least be discussed (Janka 1985). As will be shown below, the 
power of the ejido assembly changed constantly as a consequence of the 
shifting political-institutional environment, but the ejido assembly as such 
soon became an institution that could not be bypassed for most land-use 
issues, forest and non-forest.  
 In this phase, agriculture in these ejidos remained mainly subsistence 
production. Chicle extraction and logging continued to be much more 
attractive than other land uses for several years, and virtually no marketing 
channels existed for agricultural products. As this was a frontier connected to 
the outside world by relatively long waterways, only products with a certain 
value-weight ratio made it out of the region (Cesar and Arnaiz 1983:118).  
 The predominance of forest uses in the region endured until the early 
1960s. Although no new ejidos would be granted for almost 20 years (a 
hiatus from 1945 to 1964), new arrivals to the ejidos as well as adult 
ejidatario sons establishing own families would be easily integrated: most 
ejidos received supplementary lands for that purpose. Although under the 
Margarito Ramirez rule, governor of Quintana Roo from 1944 to 1959, the 
political, productive and financial conditions for ejidatarios worsened, this 
did not affect the pillars of this land-use system. Only the change in 
agricultural and colonization policies in the 1960, as well as the gradual 
reduction of chicle demand and prices after WW2 would lead to modified 
land use processes (Galletti 1993; Forster 1994). 
 
Ideologies, institutions, and organizations 
Ideologies 
 Government officials that took land-use, production and trade 
decisions for Quintana Roo in the first half of the 20th century operated under 
very diverse ideological backgrounds. The modernist state-building of the 
Porfirio Diaz´ rule around 1900 was supplanted by strong swinging 
ideological courses in the first decades after the revolution. Explaining the 
drafting of one of the central laws for natural resource management in post-
revolutionary Mexico, the Article 27, a contemporaneous observer remarked:  
 “...living in a world bent on its own destruction, Mexico in 1917 was 
sucked willy-nilly into the currents of social change she had so long 
resisted... [and] with her accustomed hospitality, opened wide the doors 
[for] Henry George, Peter Kropotkin, Karl Marx and the familiar host of 
their followers. Their ideas and theories, together with the much more 
familiar and influential figure of Auguste Comte all went into the pot 
together. To these were added rediscovered principles and precedents from 
Spanish Colonial law, theories of “rights and justice” derived from a naive 
reaction to agrarian exploitation, and doctrines of social control learned 
from the belligerent nations in the World War. The resultant brew was 
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served up in the 1917 constitution in concentrated form in Article 27” 
(Simpson 1937:63). 
 The ideological diversity or even inconsistency reflected in this cite 
continued for several decades. After the signing of Article 27 (described with 
more detail below), Venustiano Carranza, a conservative revolutionary and 
Mexican president from 1917 to 1920, enacted several amendments that 
thwarted its implementation. Alvaro Obregón, having come  to power after 
Carranza´s assassination and president from 1920 to 1924, retook the course 
of the reform, but also must be considered a moderate that “exhibited a 
caution which in the face of the high sounding phrases of revolutionary 
doctrine and the specific promises of Article 27 amounted to undue timidity 
if not plain cowardice” (Simpson 1937:87). His successor, Plutarco Elías 
Calles, in office from 1924 to 1928 and the power behind the throne until the 
mid 1930s, pressed stronger on the land reform. His vision was a large body 
of small landholders. Communal land holding was just a step in this 
direction, as individual peasants were seen as to weak to be able to manage 
land for themselves. His successor, Lázaro Cardenas, in power from 1934 to 
1940, became the president that most openly sympathized with the ideals of 
land reform and communal land holding (Simonian 1999). 
 In general terms, the Mexican revolution brought a more 
collectivistic spirit in legislation and political program (Simpson 1937:64), 
but it was not until Cardenas that this spirit became a moving factor in 
Quintana Roo. Cardenas had visited the region during his presidential 
campaign and would devote special attention to it during his presidency, 
among others appointing a kindred spirit as governor: Rafael Melgar. In the 
wake of WW2 and in a time of intense political debate, when for example 
many leading intellectuals and artists were declared communists (Benitez 
1978:185), while the former president and still strongman (Plutarco Elias 
Calles) was attracted to fascism, Cardenas had the difficult task to form a 
mass party, the later Partido the la Revolución Institutional (PRI), integrating 
both sympathies for communism as well as an increasing conservatism 
(Delgado de Cantu 2003:208). His ideological “fire exit” was composed of 
cooperativism, syndicalism and the support of land reform through ejidos. 
All three elements would translate into concrete organizations during his 
term that proved surprisingly resilient in Quintana Roo67: Forest 
cooperatives and ejidos are still well and alive in the present. The forest 
worker unions, more short-lived, were still active in the seventies. For 
example, the logging workers union (Sindicato de Caoberos), formed under 
                                                            
67 This conclusion, derived from the present study, stands in contrast to other opinions, 
expressed for Mexico at large, like Bray, D. B. and L. Merino Perez (2004). Los Bosques 
Comunitarios de Mexico. Logros y Desafios. F. Ford, T. W. a. F. H. Foundation, 
SEMARNATet al, Editora Infagon S.A de C.V: 31. 
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the influence of Cardenas, still was commanding salary negotiations in the 
forest industry in the 1970s.  
 After Cardenas, who certainly was more interested and engaged in 
natural resource conservation than most Mexican presidents before and after 
him, the long phase of pro-industrialization thinking began, and with it, a 
certain depreciation of rural production and livelihoods. In southern 
Quintana Roo, this led to a 20 year long hiatus in the establishment of new 
ejidos from 1945 to 1964. 
 Besides the debates referred above, there was another notable 
ideological discussion during the presidency of Cardenas: the one about the 
purpose of forests. Concerning the two questions of how to conserve forests 
and how to use them to promote development, the discussions of the 
Cardenas time were well beyond discussions before and after it. While not 
exactly reflecting the utilitarian-preservationist antagonism in the United 
States, the arguments went in similar directions. For Miguel Angel de 
Quevedo, a forester with a long trajectory in forest conservation and head of 
the autonomous forest department during Cardenas, the most important 
function of forests was their impact on soil and water: forests could prevent 
erosion and floods, two important problems in Mexico. To conserve forests, 
he favoured restrictive measures, and he rejected the granting of wooded 
land to ejidos: after a trip to Quintana Roo in 1937, he publicly held 
ejidatarios and chicleros responsible for degrading and converting forests 
(Quevedo 1937: cited in Simonian 1995:91)  As such, his views were clearly 
apart from Cardenas`, who believed that forests could be conserved through 
their wise use, and that the monetary value of forest products was an 
important development asset that could be used to support rural poor. 
Therefore, while neither of them was a strict preservationist that promoted 
forest conservation as a means for itself, neither was a strict utilitarian, 
promoting forest “mobilization” (Westoby 1987:196) or even conversion to 
kick-start other industries. Several high level officials in the Cardenas 
administration maintained the later position, calling Quevedo a romantic 
conservationist and a social reactionary. These utilitarian positions would 
become dominant after Cardenas (Simonian 1999:77-85). 
 As a part of the discussion mentioned above, the question arose of 
where in the official organization chart the forest service should be situated. 
Should forestry regarded mainly as a productive activity, not too different 
from agriculture, and therefore integrated in the Ministry of Agriculture? Or 
should it be regarded mainly under the perspective of its conservation, more 
like hydraulic resources, and therefore independent from the Ministry of 
Agriculture? The Departmento Autónomo Forestal de Caza y Pesca, created 
under Cardenas with Quevedo as the head, strongly held the second position, 
but this proved to be a minority opinion that would take almost half a century 
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to become dominant. In fact, Cardenas himself decided to close the 
Department and transfer its functions to the Ministry of Agriculture  
(Simonian 1999:108; Cervantes and Arriaga 2008:164). 
 Another important ideological feature of the Cardenas time that 
would pervade later decades until neoliberalism put an end to it, was the idea 
of the possibility of a double economy: a traditional economy could flourish 
parallel to modern sectors. While Cardenas expressly promoted the 
traditional economy, later presidents would at least respect the organizations 
of this economy: national and regional peasant´s and craftsmen organizations 
in the umbrella of the PRI. 
 At the local level, environment culture, as an attitude towards or 
knowledge about forests, began on a very low point. In 1929, a governmental 
observer wrote: 
 “These are the people in Quintana Roo: the employees, the indios, 
the chicleros, and the merchants. Of them all, only the indio has roots in this 
soil....The employee does not know nor love the territory. Feeling himself in 
a temporary exile, it will never occur to him to plant a tree or cultivate a 
flower. The chiclero and the merchant have no other tradition than that of 
their own raids. Like a gold digger in a foreign place, they confront the 
forest without knowing or loving it, just armed with their Mexican stoicism 
and resistance...Those that now are chicleros were, during the bonanza in 
Tampico, workers in the oil fields, or railroad workers, soldiers, packers, 
people without a trade, having had them all...” (Saenz 1990:127)68. 
 As the “indios” to which Saenz refers were Mayas in central 
Quintana Roo, it might be concluded that in the study region, in southern 
Quintana Roo, there existed no tradition of forest use, not in individual terms 
and even less in community terms. This was the typical frontier populated by 
deportees, adventurers, and the displaced. As such, southern Quintana Roo 
differs clearly from other regions in Mexico, like Oaxaca, where community 
land use dates back to colonial times (Antinori and Rausser 2006) 
 
Laws 
 The legal base for the establishment of ejidos is Article 27 of the 
Mexican constitution of 1917, issued just after the end of the revolution. 
Having no access to land was one of the main triggers for the insurrection, 
and article 27 reflects the many facets at play in the issue of land ownership. 
While the article is very wide, covering for example the nature of property 
on subsoil resources, an important space is destined to community property 
and the procedures of agrarian reform. The article differentiates two sorts of 
communities: those that traditionally had held community property, 
                                                            
68 Translation RF 
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eventually losing it during the long regime of Porfirio Diaz (president-
dictator from 1876 to 1911, when the revolution began), and those that never 
had any property. The large majority of communities of the first group were 
indigenous, therefore being named comunidades indígenas. The second 
group was named ejido. While the strategy for the first was basically 
restitution, for the second group, lands had to be deliberately expropriated or 
gained from inhabited regions (Simpson 1937:69). 
 The proposed legal concept for comunidades indigenas was basically 
the same as for ejidos: in both cases, the general assembly obtained clearly 
limited usufruct rights: no land could be sold, hypothecated, rented or leased. 
In all cases, the usufruct was over “waters, woods and lands” of the granted 
area. Obtaining land was a right of all those in need of it, and the state had 
the obligation of providing it. The development of the concept and its 
implementation were far from linear, as the revolution in itself had been a 
disordered undertaking that moved on a trial and error mode (Simpson 
1937). Nevertheless, when land distribution finally happened in Quintana 
Roo almost 20 years after the law was issued, the most important issues had 
been solved, and the granting of ejidos had become a routine. As such, it 
became feasible to establish forest surface instead of land surface as the main 
distribution criterion. (Rosado Vega 1998 [1940]). 
 While comunidades indigenas and ejidos got very similar internal 
regulations as derived from Article 27, the communities behind it could not 
been more diverse: on the one extreme were traditional indigenous 
communities with hundreds of years of common land use and governance 
and a strong internal cohesion and having the same cultural background; on 
the other extreme were groups of landless peasants from all parts of Mexico 
that had come together just to receive the land and but which would have 
very much preferred to receive individual titles. The case of southern 
Quintana Roo might be settled somewhere in between, as here there was at 
least a common land use activity: most ejidatarios had come to the region as 
chicle tappers or logging workers. 
 In the shadow of article 27 and its important implications for land 
property and land use, a forest law was promulgated in 1926. This law set up 
important categories. Among others, forests standing on ejido land were 
recognized as ejido property, giving ejidos specific rights and duties with 
regard to them (Art. 12 to 17). Specifically, the use of ejido forests was 
granted exclusively to “cooperatives formed by neighbours of the place”69. 
Another milestone was the establishment of a forest service (Art. 41 to 43), 
                                                            
69 Art. 16: „La explotación comercial de los terrenos forestal comunales o ejidales solamente 
se podrá hacer por organizaciones cooperativas formadas por vecinos del lugar.” 
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the promotion of reforestation (Art. 22 to 28) and the requirement of 
extraction permits issued by the Ministry of Agriculture (Art. 17, 20 and 51).  
 While the law certainly was progressive for its time, its impact on 
land use was limited. As Tom Gill, a student of Mexican forestry wrote in 
the early thirties: “One must reluctantly admit that the present forestry law 
in Mexico has not greatly hindered the vandalization of forests. For laws, for 
themselves, the history of nations amply proves, possess little force, unless 
behind them stands the alert police power of government and the good will 
of a nation´s people” (Simonian 1999:84). The imbalance of legal 
parameters and the institutional enforcement weakness would be repeated by 
posterior laws. 
 
Organizations 
 In 1934, when Cardenas became president of Mexico, he established 
the Department of Forestry, Fish and Game at the same hierarchic level as 
the Department of Agriculture. Its first (and only) director became Miguel 
Angel de Quevedo. With Cardenas’ support, the Department received a 
significant budget, and was able to start an important reforestation program. 
During that time, almost 40 national parks were created, that cover 75% of 
the total area  of current national parks in the country (does not include other 
categories of protected areas, like Biosphere Reserves) (Simonian 1999:94). 
 Despite its serious efforts, the Department of Forestry was not able to 
reverse the destruction of forests. Its budget, large for that time, was 
insufficient for a coercive conservation policy, as envisioned by de Quevedo, 
who always promoted strict law enforcement. While such a coercive 
enforcement would have been well beyond the possibilities of the Mexican 
government, de Quevedo himself saw the problem that the forest policies 
implemented in his department were more than countervailed by land reform 
and agricultural policies. His opposition to land reform beyond the 
agricultural frontier brought him in serious conflict to other politicians. The 
department was closed in 1940.  
 In Quintana Roo, the state did not get involved effectively in forest 
management in the first half of the 20th century. The law of 1926 established 
a forest service but mainly gave it control functions, therefore leaving 
management to private entrepreneurs in charge of extraction. This general 
approach did not change with the next law of 1942, which returned to the 
establishment of huge concessions for private companies.  
 As criticized by de Quevedo, in Quintana Roo the dynamics of forest 
uses were less connected to forest laws, forest policies or the organizational 
steps for their implementation, but to colonization, land distribution, 
agricultural and tax collecting policies. Nevertheless, in Quintana Roo, the 
conversion and clear cutting problems of other regions in Mexico did not 
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appear in the Cardenas time, because the general design of colonization had 
been developed around forest production.  
 In Quintana Roo, far away from the central power, directives were 
more important than laws. Since forest production was central for the 
economic life, its handling was a matter of top officials. While formal 
proceedings existed, the way things finally got organized depended strongly 
on the character and attitude of these top officials. Rafael Melgar, Cardenas 
governor in Quintana Roo, seems to have been driven by a strong idealism 
that implied what later would be called “empowering” rural dwellers. By 
contrast, his successor in the forties, Margarito Ramirez, started taking forest 
extraction as a private business and moved himself into the centre of the 
chicle and wood business, strongly centralizing all functions and implicitly 
disempowering peasants organizations (Galletti 1993). 
 
Production chains 
 Two basic types of production chains were in place from 1900 to 
1950. In the first, private entrepreneurs played a central role in almost all 
steps of regional value adding. In the second, community organizations, in 
part with a strong state interference, gained access to controlling several 
production links. The emergence of the second type occurred in the relatively 
short period of the Cardenas/ Melgar governments in the second half of the 
1930s, and was much clearer for chicle production than for wood, as the high 
investments and technical knowledge required in logging operations 
inhibited the displacement of private entrepreneurs by community 
organizations. 
 In the first three decades of the 20th century, the concession to private 
companies became the main extraction form for logs and chicle. The 
characteristics of concessions varied strongly, being more long term, larger 
and more often granted to overseas firms before 1915, this is, before the 
revolutionary forces gained power. The earliest concessions issued by the 
Mexican government concerned mahogany extraction. Although small 
amounts of chicle had been extracted already in the 19th century, 
commercially important extraction did not start until 1917 (Careaga 
1990:189). Chicle extraction was done by different people than log 
extraction. As chicle was much easier to transport than logs, the geographic 
definition of concession areas was less important, and the overlapping of 
concession areas would only become a problem in later years, when the 
demand started surpassing the regional production potential.  
 During this period, overseas markets and the firms that represented 
the doorway to these markets were central for regional production. These 
companies had complete control over operations until the 1920s, when the 
foreign firms were displaced from the formal entitlement of operations, 
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leaving that task to national firms, which they provided with funding in 
agreements that were strongly binding for the national entrepreneurs, and 
which often put the latter in the position of front men (Galletti 1993). In the 
30s, after the empowerment of community organizations in the chicle 
production, foreign firms ceased to finance and control the operations and a 
more market-like interface among these actors appeared.  
 
Chicle production 
 Initially, chicle extraction worked through the so-called contratista 
system, a hierarchical system of formally independent subcontractors. The 
external buyer normally negotiated with regional contratistas (jobbers/ 
contractors). On his part, the contratista might hire subcontratistas or directly 
the chicleros, paying them an advance at the season´s beginning, and 
providing them with food and working materials as they have to spend 
several months in the forest, and charging these materials at the end of the 
season. These supplies would be sold to prohibitive prices, knowing 
chicleros had no choice to buy elsewhere (Beteta 1990:163). This system 
worked with the capital of the external firms, which would delegate tasks 
and hand out funds in a well dosed mixture of control and trust: 
 “In this way, a debt and interest chain becomes established....the 
chiclero is the enemy of the subcontratista, his creditor he would like to 
escape from; the subcontratista, for the same reason, is the enemy of the 
general contratista, who himself hates the agent of the American company 
who extorts him with the chicle price...” (Beteta 1990:161).  
 Under the government of Melgar, and with the support of Cardenas at 
the federal level, a new structure was added and partially substituted the 
contratista system. Parallel to the establishment of ejidos, Melgar conceived 
a system of production and consumption cooperatives delivering their 
produce to a second level organization: the Federación de Cooperativas 
Chicleras. The cooperatives were more of working groups than independent 
enterprises with own assets, as they were narrowly supervised by the 
Federación de Cooperativas Chicleras. The Federación had the task of 
financing the operation and negotiate the sales. Basically, contratistas and 
sub-contratistas were replaced by the cooperativas-Federación structure. 
The Federación itself received an initial fund, but then started acting as a 
profitable enterprise with own funds. 
 The cooperatives controlled several links of chicle production. All 
field operations on ejido land (scouting of trees, tapping the trees, processing 
the resin at the field camp, the basic product and production controls, the 
administration of the individual production accounts, managing the field 
camp) were now in hand of cooperatives. Cooperatives also took over 
supplying the chicleros. The transport of the chicle out of the forest, its 
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storage, quality controls, the financing of the operation, the marketing and 
negotiation of products, and the political lobbying were in the hand of the 
Federación de Cooperativas Chicleras.  
 The influence of communities in this structure has often been 
discussed. For the first time, community forest owners had acquired 
significant influence on the production chain, controlling some of the tasks 
that were beyond the mere chicle tapping. The influence of cooperative 
members in their own cooperative was direct and strong, but the decisions 
that were taken at this level were mostly of logistical nature. The marketing, 
purchasing and organization decisions were taken in the Federación, where 
cooperatives had a much weaker representation. Usually each cooperative 
sent two delegates to the general assemblies of the Federación, where they 
would vote on general issues. By contrast, the technical staff that took the 
operative decisions did not belong to the cooperatives, but was composed 
completely of “experts” (Rosado Vega 1998 [1940]:351-354).  
 Coinciding with the critique of paternalism are the relatively few 
accounts regarding the agency of communities in the process of land 
granting and the establishment of cooperatives. To obtain an ejido grant, 
village members had to make a formal request, therefore requiring a minimal 
organization capacity. Concession holders tried by all means to frustrate 
those initiatives, as this would interfere with their concessions. “Whenever 
chicle workers tried to organize to request lands, concession 
holders....responded in a violent manner, be it by defeating them through 
hunger, be it by destroying their houses or devastating their fields” 
(Villalobos-Gonzalez 2004:223).  
 Some other mentions do suggest that cooperatives were an unknown 
idea for chicleros. A decree from the territorial government, issued Dec.3rd, 
1937, states: “creation of socialist Saturday celebrations....that help publicize 
all matters pertaining the implanted cooperative system” (Careaga 
1990:246). Gay and Pérez (1937) wrote: “the workers have....started trusting 
a system of undeniable benefits, but that, having been distorted too often, 
had not been able to become rooted in their proletarian consciousness” 
(p252)  
 
Log extraction  
 The log extraction in the 20th century started with large overseas 
firms and the granting of formal, geographically well defined concessions. 
Before the revolution, four large concessions, covering from 70,000 to 
700,000 ha were issued (Cesar and Arnaiz 1983:63)70. These were large, 
                                                            
70 Concessions were issued to the Stamford Manufacturing Co., the Mengel Brothers Co., 
the Banco de Londres y México, and the Plummer & Reyes Co., or to Mexican front men. 
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capital intensive operations that normally were strongly vertically integrated, 
controlling the complete operation from the search of trees to the sale of 
lumber. These companies had no supervision besides fiscal controls at the 
main transport bottleneck, the mouth of the Rio Hondo. Having acquired the 
concession, their main problems on site were those connected to the 
technical tasks of extraction, very often associated to the land transport of 
logs. As mentioned above, contrary to other regions in Mexico, these 
companies invested heavily in extraction infrastructure and machinery 
(roads, skidders, cranes, railroads, piers, etc.), and made important progress 
in the land transportation of logs, thus being able to enter deep into the 
forests to extract mahogany. From the perspective of production, this implied 
high entry barriers attached to high returns. Therefore, the dominant opinion 
was that only large companies would be able to use the richness of the forest. 
 As the foreign companies lost their concessions in the twenties, the 
whole concession system changed, and so did the production. The new 
concessionaires were ex-contractors of the foreign firms, which now did the 
extraction on their own, funded and partly controlled by the foreign firms. 
Smaller concession areas and shorter concession times appeared. 
Concessionaires reduced investments in infrastructure and machinery, and 
their ability of land transportation of logs diminished, leading to an increased 
exploitation of areas located near the water. As these areas got exhausted 
faster, concessionaires had to move frequently. For the new entrepreneurs, 
the main problem was actually obtaining the concession, as their assignation 
depended on personal connections to government officers, and not on a 
formal bidding process (Aguirre 1990 [1925]:117; Galletti 1993:147). 
 This new structure of smaller, locally appointed concessionaires 
remained practicable until the 1970s. Nevertheless, the area this type of 
concessions covered diminished constantly, as more and more ejidos were 
granted after 1930. During the Melgar time, the logging concessions were 
not seriously questioned, although Melgar promoted the establishment of 
logging worker unions that effectively uniformed and improved wages for 
different tasks. Melgar established two cooperatives in the wood processing, 
but neither of them was able to develop a lasting working concept (Rosado 
Vega 1998 [1940]:350). 
 Through the double change in land ownership from the state to the 
newly created ejidos, and in the production chain, replacing chicle 
contratistas with the cooperative structure, the Cardenas/ Melgar 
governments firmly established forest communities in the production chain. 
With modifications, this structure has survived until today. “Unfriendly” 
moves in the next decades would shift the power relations in the production 
chains, therefore altering the share of value for the actors along the chain, but 
they would not be able to change the chain altogether. One aspect had not 
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been conclusively defined: the ejido ownership, which was formally a 
usufruct right, had not expressly been extended to cover the rights on 
standing timber. The next decades would be characterized by the efforts of 
different actors to close this gap in their favour. 
Markets and market insertion 
 During the 20th century, international demand for chicle and 
mahogany followed different paths. Chicle production expanded until WW2, 
to slowly fade out afterwards. By contrast, mahogany production stalled 
around 30,000 m3 a year – with strong yearly variations -- until WW2, to 
consistently grow in the decades after.  
 While no consolidated numbers exist for chicle demand, its strong 
growth in the first three decades is apparent, especially in the US, where it 
went from 3.8 billion sticks (39 per person) in 1914 to 13.3 billion sticks 
(109 per person) in 1929 (Landon 1935:185). It seems that the first demand 
peak was achieved in the late 1920s, chicle gum-base imports to the US 
surpassing 35,000 tons (Mathews and Schultz 2009:55). During the 
economic depression in the early 1930s, demand for gum-base fell below 
10,000 tons. Production recovered with the beginning of the war, but its 
growth was limited as very soon, several ingredients for the chewing gum 
manufacture, most importantly sugar, were strongly rationed (Mathews and 
Schultz 2009:60), forcing the main companies to focus exclusively on 
supplying the army (Wrigley 2006). On the other side, chicle production had 
increasing difficulties in meeting demand as Manilkara stands had been 
overused and tropical forests were increasingly converted to other land uses. 
 In this time, the US chewing-gum industry, by far the most important 
worldwide, was involved in a strong concentration process. From 74 firms in 
1914, the number went down to 29 in 1929. In 1935, three firms produced 
95% of chewing gum in the US. The William Wrigley Jr. Company 
produced around 60%, the Beech-Nut Packing Company 20% and the 
American Chicle Company, a consortium controlled by John Adams, 15%. 
This concentration was attributed to three main causes: the investment cost 
of machinery, the difficulty smaller firms had matching the larger firms 
advertising, and the difficulty smaller firms had in buying gum-base: 
 “...to ensure a supply of chicle, a concession must be obtained from 
some Latin American government. Some chicle is sold by brokers and native 
gatherers, but a manufacturer cannot depend upon these market channels for 
a sufficient supply” (Landon 1935:183). 
 In this phase, chicle gum-base was mainly produced in Mexico and 
Guatemala. These two countries usually counted for more than 70% of world 
production. As demand for chicle gum-base increased, American firms 
searched for other sources, but had little luck. Natural chicle substitutes 
proved inadequate for chewing gum, and chicle gum-base coming from other 
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Latin American countries remained expensive and of bad quality (Ponce 
Jiménez 1990:32). In Mexico, production progressively concentrated in the 
Yucatán Peninsula, mainly in the states of Campeche and Quintana Roo, as 
the production in other states, like Veracruz, the first state to produce 
commercial chicle (Schwartz 1990:140), had stalled. In the 1930s, Campeche 
and Quintana Roo produced 97% of the total Mexican production (Heuer 
1945).  
 Chicle prices fluctuated greatly. The export price (fob export 
harbour) seems to have remained stable at a low level in the beginning 
thirties. By contrast, during the pre-war and war years, the gum-base more 
than seven folded its price (Heuer 1945). This increase has been explained 
with the raising demand after the depression and during the war (Ponce). On 
the other hand, several authors have highlighted the overuse of Manilkara 
stands, although not connecting it to the price increase. At the level of 
chicleros, prices also changed greatly. The available information refers to 
prices chicleros received for raw gum-base at camp-site in Quintana Roo: in 
1929, the quintal, an old mass measure equivalent to little more than 46 kg, 
brought between 50 and 60 Pesos (Villanueva 1975), this is, between 34 and 
41 US cents per kg. In 1932, this price had dropped to 17.50 Pesos (12 US 
cents per kg), fuelling discontent and emigration (Careaga 1990:193). In 
1934, prices had risen to 20 to 25 Pesos per quintal, in part as a consequence 
of a peso devaluation, to reach 75 to 80 Pesos (46 to 49 US cents/ kg) as 
cooperatives consolidated (Rosado Vega 1998 [1940]:356). 
 Production in Quintana Roo closely reflects the market tendencies 
described above. Starting in 1918, the production soon increased to reach a 
first peak in the 1927/28 season when almost 2,900 tons were produced. The 
collapse of the production in the early thirties and its continued increase after 
1935 both echo international demand. As a consequence of the great 
depression, production fell below 1,000 tons (Cesar and Arnaiz 1983:220), 
or, after other accounts, even as low as 300 tons in 1934 (Careaga 1990:190). 
 During this time, the relative importance of Quintana Roo for the 
total Mexican exports increased. While in 1934, Quintana Roo produced 
roughly 25% of the Mexican gum-base, in 1937 it had reached 58% and in 
1940 almost 70%, to recede to around 50% in the following years(Cesar and 
Arnaiz 1983:222). 
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Figure 1 Volumes and prices in Chicle production 
*) Left schale: tons/year. Right schale: USD/kg. Prices refer to the prices negotiated among 
contratistas and chewing gum companies at a national level (Heuer in Ponce). Source does 
not specify point of handover, most probably free on board at Mexican shipping port (see 
Ponce p.82). Original quote in USD/quintal. To convert to kg, the American 
Shorthundredweight has been used: 1 Quintal = 100 Pounds = 45.359 kg. 
Source for volumes: Cesar Dachary 
 
 As described above, between 1918 and 1935, production in Quintana 
Roo (and Campeche) was not directly vertically integrated, but normally 
worked with a hierarchical subcontracting system. At the top of the hierarchy 
were the US-firms or their Mexican branches, like the Mexican Exploitation. 
Their direct counterparts were a handful of regional contractors, which often 
delegated work to subcontractors. Smaller contractors would often request a 
concession and then cede it to larger contractors under several arrangements. 
Through the payment of advances, US-firms had a strong influence in the 
system. Nevertheless, the costs of change were reduced, at least from one 
year to another: regional contractors, being the formal concession holders, 
would negotiate with different US-American firms, therefore achieving a 
certain negotiation power. Contractors and subcontractors were organized in 
independent state-wide organizations. The number of contractors with the 
control of large concessions was reduced, perhaps less than ten, and as such, 
they were important players in the production chain (Ponce Jiménez 
1990:15). 
 When in the thirties, the two-layered structure of cooperatives and 
Federation of cooperatives partially replaced the contratista structure– 
Melgar had left the contratista structure intact outside the ejidos - the power 
balance ostensibly shifted towards production. The Federación de 
Cooperativas achieved a strong horizontal concentration of production, 
obtaining a negotiation mass of over 800 tons of gum-base. Furthermore, this 
organization was not forced to negotiate under the pressure of advances 
received from chicle buyers. Its bargaining power was further enhanced by 
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the fact that the Federación received full support from the state and federal 
governments. Although the traditional contratistas as a group still were 
producing almost three times as much chicle as the Federación, individually, 
none of them had the volumes and the negotiating power of the Federación. 
As such, as soon as it was created, the Federación became the preponderant 
player in the region. 
 For external buyers it was almost impossible to bypass or out 
negotiate the Federación. While the two main overseas buyers, Wrigley 
(officially, the William Wrigley Jr. Company) and Mexican Exploitation, 
certainly were large, powerful organizations (Rosado Vega 1998 
[1940]:352), they had difficulties in establishing alternative supplies: the two 
other supplier regions, Belize and the Petén, were controlled by other 
companies. Moreover, these other regions produced smaller amounts of 
chicle, Mexico having a market participation of approximately 75% in 1929. 
Plus, all gum-base volumes were needed (Reyna, Gramajo et al. 1999:41).  
 The new structure also brought a clearer transaction border in the 
sense of an “interface” (Williamson 1987:1): instead of different degrees of 
control that external firms held over regional production through financing, 
logistics, and quality control, now the exchange of product against money 
became central, this is, the market characteristics of the commercial 
interaction increased. This clear interface was enabled, among others, by the 
fact that the product, raw gum base, was relatively simple to handle. There 
was only one quality with clear and easily verifiable definitions, high 
traceability of individual lots, and little technical requirements to achieve the 
quality (Forero and Redclift 2006:75). 
 The basic relationship among cooperatives, as represented by the 
Federación, and the overseas buyers was determined by the reduced 
complexity of required transactional information, the good possibilities to 
codify requirements, and the relatively high operative capabilities at the side 
of the cooperatives. After Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon (2005), these are 
good preconditions for the development of relatively egalitarian market 
relationships. As the state and federal governments has solved the problem of 
financing, the relationship among Federación and American raw gum-base 
buyers became centered upon a relatively clear market transaction.  
 Summing up, communities achieved market insertion in a very short 
time, as a consequence of several parallel efforts. First, communities became 
officially acknowledged as such and at the same time obtained official 
recognition of forest ownership. Then, they were organized in production 
cooperatives, receiving technical assistance and start-up capital, and, shortly 
after, obtained support in establishing a second level organization to manage 
all financial, marketing, general logistical, purchasing, and organizational 
tasks. Additionally, the strong governmental support in confronting 
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contratista interests, adjusting norms, creating support organizations and 
providing working capital was critical.  
 Such an account again neglects the activities initiated in the 
communities to improve their market insertion. About this subject, little is 
known beyond a trip several members of cooperatives did in 1943 to the US 
in order to negotiate the prices of chicle gum-base with representatives of 
several chewing-gum producers (Mathews and Schultz 2009:58). No further 
documents were discovered that could provide a deeper appreciation of 
community initiatives, and the contemporary witnesses that could contribute 
to an understanding could not be found. 
 The impact of the new institutional setting for communities was 
manifold. In a vertical sense, the inception of the new structure brought the 
opportunity to skimming value-added. The first cooperative that was 
established sold 6 tons in 1936, tripling the incomes for the gum base from 
0.15 USD/kg to almost 0.40 USD/kg. This increase is not related to external 
price increases, devaluations, or other external changes, but came from the 
different production chain involvement of the cooperatives. Another part 
certainly came from subsidized services the government started providing, 
like financing or storage of products. As can be seen in Table 1, the different 
incomes did not come from higher external market prices (achieved in the 
37-38 season), and the original quote in Mexican Pesos 
(Rosado,1948[1940]:258) was neither a result of a different exchange rate. 
Another important impact was on the side of chiclero expenses. Contratistas 
had had the privilege of selling all working tools and other supplies needed 
in the forest to the chicleros charging elevated prices. Now, these items were 
supplied by the cooperatives to a much lower price. (Beteta 1990:259) 
Table 1: chicle gum-base prices in the 1930s 
 Exchange Rate 
Pesos/USD 
USD/kg* USD/kg** Value 
participation 
1935-1936 3.60 0.52 0.12 27% 
1936-1937 3.60 0.52 0.39 75% 
1937-1938 5.19 0.72 na Na 
Original quotes in Mexican Peso/quintal or USD/ quintal. To convert to kg, the American 
Shorthundredweight has been used: 1 Quintal = 100 Pounds= 45.359 kg. 
*) fob price paid by American companies to main regional contratistas. 
**) Incomes received by chicleros 
Sources: (Rosado Vega 1998 [1940]), (Ponce Jiménez 1990), (Careaga 1990) 
 
 Logs: as with chicle, the main change in the market insertion of 
communities came with the Melgar/ Cárdenas administration, when the loose 
settlements of chicleros became officially ejidos. As described above, the 
land grants were explicitly conceived for forest use, primarily the non-timber 
use of chicle. As the ejido land grant was basically a usufruct right that 
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included forests, and as the use of timber had not been explicitly granted to 
the ejidos, a legal grey zone appeared. Although no one denied that ejidos 
had the usufruct rights on forests, concessions continued to be conceded by 
the government, and it was also the government that set and charged the 
concession duties (Galletti 1993:149). 
 “Socializing” log production was a lot more difficult than chicle 
production: the investments, knowledge and working capital needs were 
much higher in the timber business than in chicle tapping. Melgar clearly 
took the strategic decision to tackle chicle production while leaving log 
production in its old forms (Rosado Vega 1998 [1940]:48)71. Nevertheless, 
two cooperatives related to wood extraction and processing were created. 
Unlike the chicle cooperatives, none of them had a direct relation to a 
specific ejido, both working on federal forests. Their member homogeneity, 
the fact that most members weren´t actually wood workers, and the fact that 
the cooperatives were located in Chetumal soon made them difficult to 
defend, but a signal had been sent that logs could eventually be managed by 
communities (Rosado Vega 1998 [1940]:352) 
 
Discussion 
 The results show that during the first half of the 20th century, land-use 
in Quintana Roo was centered around forest uses, mainly the commercial 
extraction of chewing gum-base, mahogany logs and logwood. While the 
latter would soon disappear as a commercial product, the first two were 
important products throughout the five decades described in this paper.   
 Building on these land-uses, clearly defined value chains appeared. 
On one side, the extraction of mahogany started as a vertically integrated 
regional chain which would later split into several links. On the other, the 
chewing gum-base chain held several production links from the beginning, 
and changes were more about which actor controlled a certain value link.  
 Only in the second chain did forest communities succeed in entering. 
Here, the bold intervention of the state government certainly was the central 
determinant. The initiative of establishing ejidos and organizing its members 
with cooperatives, and furthermore creating a second-level organization to 
manage all chicle extraction and marketing activities until its export, was the 
central change in the late 1930s.  
 Despite the general recognition of this policy, the steps taken by 
Melgar and Cardenas have often been criticized by contemporary scholars. 
Several researchers have criticized the double levelled cooperative structure 
as paternalistic (e.g.Bray and Merino Perez 2004:6), implicitly rejecting the 
                                                            
71 In the timber business, Melgar had an impact through the establishment of minimum 
wages. 
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participation of the state in peasants organizations. Others point out that 
Melgar´s paternalistic style, for example his acceptance to become the 
President of the Federación, would allow his successors an easy play in co-
opting the organization for their own interests (Forero and Redclift 2006:83). 
Galletti (1993:154) states that this structure implied a “weapon of direct 
control” of the cooperative movement. Villalobos-Gonzalez (2004:229) 
argues that in central Quintana Roo, where the insurgent Maya had defended 
a precarious autonomy for several decades, Melgar used the land granting to 
break up the Maya fiefdoms that had developed during the caste war 
(Careaga:104), by conceding ejido grants to individual villages of each Maya 
fiefdom instead of to the whole fiefdom, and later establishing cooperatives 
for each ejido. Forero and Redclift (2006) sustain that “the new relationship 
towards indigenous peoples was resisted and resented by the Maya, as 
paternalistic and dependent” (p81).  
 Embedded in his time and first-hand informed about the process of 
developing the cooperative structure, Rosado Vega (Rosado Vega 1998 
[1940]) writes: 
 “The chiclero, an expert in all that is related to his rough material 
work, was and could not be technically prepared to defend his 
concerns....therefore, there existed the necessity of guiding him.....as behind 
him those large interests still are searching revenge.....as such, the direction 
and commercial management of the business were left in the hands of 
experts in the matter....although the worker always had immediate 
interference in all issues.” p.382 
 The defensive tone in the second part of the argument suggests that 
the critique of paternalism was not unknown to the political decision takers 
during the Melgar government. Rosado goes on affirming that in 1939, all 
tasks in the Federación would be transferred to members of the cooperative: 
“...this is, even the direction and the administration. Two reasons propelled 
this transcendental step: first, to consider the worker´s business knowledge 
sufficient, and second, that, as both [Cardenas and Melgar] neared the end of 
their term, wanted to see their work finished....” p.383. Although there is no 
evidence for this transference, it seems evident that the decision to promote 
government leadership was not taken lightly or as a result of a certain 
Zeitgeist, but was the result of a careful deliberation of what was possible 
and effective in terms of community participation in the chicle business72. In 
any case, a few years later, the whole structure would become a hostage of 
Margarito Ramirez, who would place his friends in decisive posts in the 
                                                            
72 Modern producer organizations in Europe work with similar labour divisions as the 
Federación: management is delegated to “experts”, which are often state employees. 
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Federación and as presidents of the cooperatives, therefore erasing most of 
the influence of communities. 
 
Conclusion 
 It can be concluded that at the regional level, the central factors that 
shaped value chains came from actors not directly involved in production, 
i.e. they were outsiders to the chain. On one side, governmental efforts 
succeeded in establishing a whole new regional chain that involved forest 
communities. On the other, the varying demand for the products determined 
the power relations among the chain members. All value chain actors had to 
subdue to these two factors. By contrast, individual efforts normally led to 
short-term improvements that had no larger relevance for the value chain. 
 State support meant huge increases in incomes for forest workers and 
their communities. It is safe to conclude that the interest and the possibilities 
of forest communities to maintain the forest cover under their control 
increased with the new incomes. 
  
References: 
Aguirre, A. (1990 [1925]). Informe que rinde al C.Presidente de la República 
el Jefe de la Comisión enviada por el mismo para hacer un estudio del 
Territorio Federal de Quintana Roo. Quintana Roo, Textos de su historia. L. 
Careaga Viliesid. Mexico City, Instituto Mora. 1. 
Alatorre Frenk, G. (1998). La construcción de una cultura gerencial 
democrática en las empresas forestales comunitarias. Mexico, DF. 
Antinori, C. and G. Rausser (2006). "Collective Choice and Community 
Forestry Management in Mexico: An Empirical Analysis." Journal of 
Development Studies 43(3): 512-536. 
Argüelles, S. L. A. (1991). Plan de Manejo Forestal del Bosque Tropical de 
la Empresa Ejidal Noh-Bec. Chapingo, México, Universidad Autònoma de 
Chapingo.  
Benitez, F. (1978). Lazaro Cardenas y la Revolución Mexicana. El 
Cardenismo. México, FCE. 
Beteta, R. (1990). La Vida en un Campamento Chiclero. México, Instituto de 
Investigaciones Dr. José María Luis Mora. 
Bray, D. B. and L. Merino-Pérez (2004). La Experiencia de las Comunidades 
Forestales en México. Mexico City, Instituto Nacional de Ecología. 
Bray, D. B. and L. Merino Perez (2004). Los Bosques Comunitarios de 
Mexico. Logros y Desafios. F. Ford, T. W. a. F. H. Foundation, 
SEMARNATet al, Editora Infagon S.A de C.V: 31. 
Camille, M. A. (1996). Historical Geography of the Belizean Logwood 
Trade. Conference of Latin Americanist Geographers, Tegucigalpa, CLAG. 
European Scientific Journal March 2016 edition vol.12, No.8  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
341 
Careaga, V. L. (1990). Quintana Roo I. Textos de su historia. México, 
Instituto de Investigaciones Dr. José María Luis Moya. 
Careaga, V. L. (1990). Quintana Roo II. Textos de su historia. México, 
Instituto de Investigaciones Dr. José María Luis Mora. 
Careaga, V. L. (1990). Quintana Roo. Una historia compartida. México, 
Instituto de Investigaciones Dr. José María Luis Mora. 
Cervantes, V. J. C. and V. Arriaga (2008). Evolución de las Políticas 
Públicas de Restauración Ambiental. Vol.III:Politicas Públicas y 
Perspectivas de Sustentabilidad. Capital Natural de México. México, 
CONABIO: 155-226. 
Cesar, D. A. and B. S. M. Arnaiz (1983). Estudios socioeconomicos 
preliminares de Quintana Roo. Sector agropecuario y forestal (1902-1980). 
Puerto Morelos, Quintana Roo., Centro de investigaciones de Quintana Roo, 
A.C. [CIQRO]. 
Delgado de Cantu, G. M. (2003). Historia de México. México en el siglo 
Veinte. México, Pearson Educacion. 
Forero, O. A. and M. Redclift (2006). "The Role of the Mexican State in the 
Development of Chicle Extraction in Yucatán, and the Continuing 
Importance of Coyotaje " Journal of Latin American Studies 38(1): 65-93. 
Forster, R. A. (1994). Hacia la sostenibilidad en el uso de los recursos 
forestales en Quintana Roo. Chetumal, Quintana Roo: 151. 
Galletti, H. A. (1993). Actividades Forestales y su Desarrollo Historico. 
Estudio Integral de la Frontera Mexico-Belice. C. d. I. d. Q. Roo. Chetumal, 
Quintana Roo, Talleres de Ferrandiz: 131-198. 
Gay-Baños, G. and F. Perez-Gomez (1937). El Movimiento Cooperativista 
en Quintana Roo. Mérida, Imprenta Gamboa Guzmán. 
Gereffi, G., J. Humphrey, et al. (2005). "The Governance of Global Value 
Chains." Review of international political economy 12(1): 78-104. 
Heuer, F. (1945). La industria del chicle. Mexico City, UNAM. 
Higuera, B. A. (1997). Quintana Roo entre Tiempos: Política, Poblamiento y 
Explotación Forestal 1872-1925. Chetumal, Universidad de Quintana Roo 
Janka, H. (1985). Landnutzungsplanung in tropischen regenwaldgebieten, 
ein erfahrungsbericht. 
Landon, C. (1935). "The Chewing Gum Industry." Economic Geography 
11(2): 183-190. 
Macías-Zapata, G. A. (2004). El ombligo de los hatos. Payo Obispo y su 
hinterland forestal. El vacío imaginario. Geopolítica de la ocupación 
territorial en el Caribe oriental mexicano. G. A. Macías-Zapata. Mexico-
City, CIESAS: 75-199. 
Macias Richard, C. (1997). Nueva Frontera Mexicana. Chetumal, Quintana 
Roo, editorial Ducere. 
European Scientific Journal March 2016 edition vol.12, No.8  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
342 
Mathews, J. P. and G. P. Schultz (2009). Chicle: the chewing gum of the 
Americas, from the ancient Maya to William Wrigley. Tucson, The 
University or Arizona Press. 
Möllering, G. (2006). Trust: reason, routine, reflexivity. Oxford, Elsevier. 
Ponce Jiménez, M. P. (1990). La montana chiclera en Campeche: vida 
cotidiana y trabajo (1900 - 1950). Mexico City, CIESAS. 
Quevedo, M. A. d. (1937). "Informe sobre la exploración forestal y de caza y 
pesca llevado a cabo en la región del sureste del territorio mexicano." Boletín 
del Departamento Forestal y de Caza y Pesca 4(June-August): 1-19. 
Reed, N. (1987). La Guerra de Castas de Yucatán. México, ERA. 
Reyna, C. A. V., S. E. Gramajo, et al. (1999). Comunidades Rurales y Áreas 
Protegidas. Análisis de la Gestión Colectiva en Dos Sitios de el Péten. 
Guatemala, FLACSO Guatemala. 
Rosado Vega, L. (1998 [1940]). Un Pueblo y un Hombre. Chetumal, 
Quintana Roo, Mexico., Editorial Norte Sur. 
Saenz, M. (1990). Impresiones de un Funcionario de Gobierno. Quintana 
Roo II: Textos de su Historia. V. L. Careaga. Mexico, Instituto de 
Investigaciones Dr. José María Luis Mora. II. 
Sánchez, P. C. and S. Toscano (1990 [1919]). La comisión geográfico-
exploradora en Quintana Roo. Quintana Roo, Textos de su historia. L. 
Careaga Viliesid. Mexico, Instituto de investigaciones Dr. Mora. 2: 90-98. 
Scott, R. (2001). Institutions and Organizations. Thousand Oaks, Sage 
Publications. 
Schwartz, N. B. (1990). Forest society: a social history of Petén, Guatemala. 
Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Simonian, L. (1999). Conservación Para el Bien Común: Los Años de 
Cárdenas. La Defensa de la Tierra del Jaguar: Una Historia de Conservación 
en México. México D.F. 1999  1-348. 
Simpson, E. N. (1937). The Ejido: Mexico´s way out. Chapel Hill, N.C., The 
University of North Carolina Press. 
Sztompka, P. (2003 [1994]). The sociology of social change. Oxford, UK, 
Blackwell Publishers. 
Villalobos-Gonzalez, M. H. (2003). "La presencia estadounidense en la 
frontera Mexico-Honduras Británica: el caso de la compañia Stamford." 
Revista Mexicana del Caribe VIII(15): 39-79. 
Villalobos-Gonzalez, M. H. (2004). Del antiguo al nuevo régimen. Bosque y 
territorialidad entre los mayas de Quintana Roo, 1890 - 1935. El Vacío 
Imaginario. G. A. Macías-Zapata. México City, CIESAS. 
Villalobos-Gonzalez, M. H. (2006). El Bosque Sitiado. Asaltos Armados, 
Concesiones Forestales y Estrategias de Resistencia Durante la Guerra de 
Castas. Mexico, CIESAS, CONACULTA-INAH, Porrua. 
European Scientific Journal March 2016 edition vol.12, No.8  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
343 
Villanueva, A. E. (1975). Estudio Sobre las Relaciones de Explotaciòn en 
una Zona Indìgena de Quintana Roo. México: 166. 
Westoby, J. C. (1987). The Purpose of Forests: Follies of Development, B. 
Blackwell. 
Williamson, O. E. (1987). The economic institutions of capitalism: Firms, 
Markets, Relational Contracting. New York, NY, London, Free 
Press,Macmillan. 
Wrigley. (2006). "Benefits of ChUse the "Insert Citation" button to add 
citations to this document. 
ewing."   Retrieved September 19, 2011, from 
http://www.wrigley.com/aunz/documents/1_stress_cognition_fact_sheet_fina
l.pdf. 
 
  
